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East Asian countries were seriously affected by the 2008 global crisis through a steep fall in 
exports. This experience exposed the vulnerability of the East Asian growth model and 
emphasized the importance of generating regional growth by expanding domestic demand 
and enlarging intra-regional trade. A key factor to achieving higher regional economic growth 
and enlarging intra-regional trade is the better connectivity of infrastructure such as roads, 
ports, airports, and rail links. Although some East Asian countries have made large 
investments in improving  their  infrastructures, others  still lag behind. In response to the 
global crisis, East Asian countries have allocated a significant proportion of their stimulus 
packages to infrastructure development. While these investments have improved national 
facilities, East Asian countries will only be well connected when there are good cross-border 
infrastructures in place. This requires a large amount of funding, and funds from both within 
and outside the region could be mobilized to fulfill these huge financing needs. Hence, an 
East Asian Infrastructure Investment Fund (EAIIF) is proposed to provide a mechanism to 
organize this funding and to be  a platform for deciding  on cross-border infrastructure 
projects. The EAIIF would be anchored to the existing Association of Southeast Asian 
Nations+3  mechanism with the  leader’s summit being  the apex of the decision making 
process. A four-level mechanism is proposed, consisting of cooperation amongst political 
leadership; a steering committee and secretariat for executing the decisions of the leaders; 
fund mobilization; and the implementation and monitoring of projects. Projects chosen could 
be those with a high rate of commercial returns or those with the highest social benefits. The 
EAIIF would invite the private sector to participate by setting a framework for the sharing of 
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1.  INTRODUCTION 
The current global financial crisis has exposed the vulnerability of East Asia’s growth model, 
which is heavily dependent on exports. Faced with the present global economic downturn, 
East Asian countries have adopted the same approach as the United States (US) and 
European Union (EU), which is to use the public sector, through fiscal stimulus programs, to 
expand domestic economic activities and replace losses resulting from fewer exports to the 
US and EU. In most East Asian countries, fiscal stimulus programs are large to compensate 
for the decline in domestic production as a result of the steep shortfall in exports. The 
measures to expand the domestic economy include both direct fiscal expenditure and other 
indirect measures such as bank credit guarantees. 
The fiscal stimulus introduced in response to the global financial crisis by East Asia was 
unprecedented in terms of size and coverage. The scale of the stimulus package reflects the 
severity of the crisis  and as a result many countries are likely to incur significant fiscal 
deficits in 2009. Low national public debt and sufficient domestic liquidity have helped in 
financing these stimulus packages. Some measures are targeted to the most affected 
groups—the poor and unemployed. Some East Asian countries are also using these 
measures to strengthen their foundation for long-term economic growth particularly through 
green and efficient technology. However, quantitatively evaluating the effectiveness of these 
measures is not easy because the effects are indirect and will only be felt in the long term. 
In most East Asian countries, a substantial portion of the fiscal stimulus packages are 
dedicated to infrastructure projects because of the projects’ extensive multiplier effects and 
ability to  meet the countries’ developmental needs. The infrastructure investments made 
were in physical facilities such as roads, bridges, ports, and airports, and  in other basic 
needs such as the  provision of water, a  more efficient energy supply,  and sustainable 
environmental management. 
The fiscal stimulus programs have been geared primarily towards reviving the slumping East 
Asian  economies in the immediate term. However,  the crisis has  also highlighted the 
region’s need to create long-term sources of growth and to reduce its dependency on the US 
and EU by increasing its own final demand, strengthening regional production links, and 
expanding intra-regional trade. Thus, the fiscal stimulus packages also include long-term 
measures to build capacity such as by building infrastructure and developing efficient and 
environmentally sustainable technologies. Developing regional infrastructure is essential for 
this purpose because less developed countries in East Asia can be connected to the more 
developed ones. In this way, the economically depressed areas of East Asia, most of which 
have relatively large populations, can also enjoy higher development by being linked to 
growth centers. The economically depressed areas will in turn provide a future market for the 
region’s goods and services, which will ensure balanced regional growth that  is  not just 
concentrated in a few countries or areas. Each East Asian country can invest in its own 
national infrastructure project that can be then linked to form a regional infrastructure 
network. Alternatively, national or regional infrastructure projects could fill in missing links to 
complete existing unfinished networks. 
There are already some cross-border regional infrastructure investments, such as those 
initiated by the Asian Development Bank (ADB) and the Government of Japan. Both of these 
institutions  support the development of the Greater Mekong Sub-region (GMS). The 
Japanese Official Development Aid (ODA) programs have been an early initiator of national 
infrastructure  in the region especially in the Association of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN) countries. More recently, roads have been built to link the southern part of the 
People’s Republic of China  (PRC)  with the Lao People’s Democratic Republic (PDR), 
Thailand, and Viet Nam. ADBI Working Paper 232    Abidin 
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Cross-border regional investment will call for innovative measures to overcome a variety of 
challenges  because by nature these investments are generally huge and their gestation 
period is long. Raising the necessary funds is a major challenge for these infrastructure 
projects. Generally, infrastructure is financed from public funds or by multilateral institutions, 
but since the amount of financing needed is large, the private sector may have to do their 
part and  support the two traditional sources of financing. The  recycling  of East Asia’s 
international reserves and savings has also been considered as an additional source of 
funding. In addition, the funding mechanism is also an important consideration—should new, 
specialized financial institutions be created, or should the roles of existing arrangements and 
institutions be expanded? 
Since these infrastructure investments involve a number of countries, effective 
implementation, including regulatory compatibility, is critical. The structure surrounding 
decision-making and implementation should be efficient, and yet it must allow all parties 
concerned to be involved, particularly at the local level. The relevant governments should be 
ready to smooth the implementation process, anticipate and avert conflicts and delays, and 
generally “grandfather” these complicated projects. 
This paper continues in Section 2 by summarizing the impact of the present global crisis. An 
assessment of the East Asian fiscal response follows in Section 3, and Section 4 examines 
the sustainability of the fiscal stimulus. Section 5 discusses the benefits of East Asian 
infrastructure investment,  while Section 6 covers the region’s infrastructure needs. The 
challenges of regional infrastructure investment are covered in Section 7. Section 8 
discusses the regional infrastructure investment funding mechanism and the conclusion is 
given in Section 9. 
2.  IMPACT OF THE PRESENT GLOBAL CRISIS ON EAST 
ASIA 
East Asia was not directly affected by the financial sector meltdown in the US and EU due to 
its relatively sound and conservative financial sector. The East Asian financial sector was 
structurally sound because of the measures introduced during the 1998 Asian financial crisis, 
such as higher capital adequacy ratios, better quality of capital, and more stringent corporate 
governance. However, it has been badly affected indirectly through the collapse of exports 
and consequentially a decline in domestic production and rising unemployment. 
The impact on East Asia began to be felt from the third quarter of 2008 through the sharp fall 
in exports. Thus, it was not surprising that the overall 2008 gross domestic product (GDP) 
growth rate was much lower than had been seen in the early months of 2008. Brunei 
Darussalam and Japan experienced recession in 2008, while Hong Kong, China; Republic of 
Korea; Singapore; Thailand; and Taipei,China grew feebly. The full impact of the crisis on 
the East Asian economies was felt in 2009. As shown in Table 1, eight out of the  15 
economies in East Asia contracted, with Singapore recording the worst economic 
performance (-9.99%) The 2010 GDP projections forecast weak growth. ADBI Working Paper 232    Abidin 
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Table 1: Gross Domestic Product (Annual Percentage Change) 
Number  Country  2008  2009 (Forecast)  2010 (Forecast) 
1  Brunei Darussalam  (1.51)  0.24  0.60 
2  Cambodia  6.03  (0.51)  2.99 
3  PRC  9.05  6.52  7.51 
4  Hong Kong, China  2.48  (4.47)  0.52 
5  Indonesia  6.06  2.50  3.50 
6  Japan  (0.64)  (6.20)  0.52 
7  Republic of Korea  2.22  (4.02)  1.53 
8  Lao PDR  7.22  4.38  4.72 
9  Malaysia  4.64  (3.50)  1.34 
10  Myanmar  4.54  5.02  4.03 
11  Philippines  4.64  3.40  0.97 
12  Singapore  1.15  (9.99)  (0.11) 
13  Thailand  2.58  (2.97)  1.04 
14  Taipei,China  0.12  (7.46)  0.01 
15  Viet Nam  6.51  3.27  3.97 
PRC = People’s Republic of China, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
Source: 2009 World Economic Outlook Database, International Monetary Fund. 
As might be expected, the severity of the economic downturn is related to the magnitude of 
each country’s exposure to the global economy. For example, Singapore’s trade-to-GDP 
ratio of 447 (World Trade Organization 2007) caused the very steep fall noted above. The 
effects of the decline in exports can be seen through the shrinking of industrial production. 
Table 2 shows that in the fourth quarter of 2008, in the nine countries sampled, industrial 
production and manufacturing production was less than in the third quarter of 2008. The fall 
in industrial production was much more pronounced in the first quarter of 2009: Japan, in 
particular had a very sharp drop. 
Table 2: Industrial/Manufacturing Index (2000=100) 
No.  Country  Q22007  Q32007  Q42007  Q12008  Q22008  Q32008  Q42008  Q12009 
1  PRC  118.3  118.1  117.5  —  115.9  113.0  106.4  — 
2 
Hong Kong, 
China  81.1  87.8  88.4  71.9  77.7  81.9  79.3  61.9 
3  Indonesia  122.7  128.9  124.8  124.3  126.7  130.9  126.6  124.5 
4  Japan  105.6  108.8  113.5  110.9  106.6  107.4  97.3  69.2 
5 
Republic of 
Korea  154.6  152.0  169.6  163.7  168.4  160.4  150.6  — 
6  Malaysia  134.6  139.1  140.5  138.7  138.8  139.5  127.7  123.6 
7  Philippines  138.5  144.3  151.8  134.6  149.2  158.9  151.1  — 
8  Singapore  141.3  156.6  148.5  151.9  133.3  139.3  132.6  — 
9  Thailand  171.9  181.9  191.9  199.3  189.3  195.8  176.4  162.5 
PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
Source: International Financial Statistics, International Monetary Fund. 
The quantum of export fall in East Asia was unprecedented. For example, from November 
2008 to April 2009, Japanese exports declined by about 40% year-on-year, as shown in 
Table 3. The sharpest fall was in high- and medium-technology manufacturing, in which East 
Asia participates strongly in supply-chain networks, for example in the production of motor 
vehicles, electronic goods, and capital machinery. Drastic falls in the volume of business of 
East Asia’s trading partners between September 2008 and February 2009 reduced exports 
to 30% of their earlier levels. The magnitude of the current crisis is one-and a-half times the ADBI Working Paper 232    Abidin 
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Asian Crisis and almost three times the information technology sector bust (International 
Monetary Fund 2009). 
Table 3: Export Performance for Selected East Asian Countries 
(Percentage Change Year-on-Year) 
Country  Dec 2008  Jan 2009  Feb 2009  Mar 2009  Apr 2009  May 2009 
PRC  (2.8)  (17.5)  (25.8)  (17.2)  (22.6)  (26.4) 
Indonesia  (34.6)  (35.9)  (27.9)  (26.0)  (25.4)  (26.3) 
Japan  (20.1)  (40.6)  (46.8)  (37.7)  (36.2)  (36.2) 
Republic of Korea  (17.9)  (34.5)  (18.5)  (22.5)  (19.9)  (29.4) 
Malaysia
a   (14.9)  (27.9)  (15.9)  (15.6)  (26.3)  (29.7) 
Singapore  (22.0)  (40.2)  (29.1)  (28.2)  (33.0)  (30.8) 
Thailand  (12.8)  (26.7)  (12.1)  (25.5)  (23.4)  (20.9) 
PRC = People’s Republic of China. 
a = data includes on cost, insurance and freight 
Sources: United Nations’ Monthly Bulletin of Statistics Online and Malaysian Ministry of International Trade and 
Industry. 
Sharp falls in exports from East Asia created excess capacity that led in some cases to 
excess inventories in related manufacturing and construction sectors. The number of 
(registered) unemployed workers rose by 0.6 million during 2008 (World Bank 2009). The 
World Bank expects that the labor markets in the region are soon going to experience shifts 
in employment across sectors combined with declining real wages. There is a strong 
likelihood that unemployment will further increase causing a rise in poverty. The incidence of 
poverty in absolute terms is expected to increase in 2009, especially in Cambodia, Malaysia, 
and Thailand (World Bank 2009). 
As noted above, the real economy will bear the brunt of the current crisis, but the capital 
markets and financial sectors of the region will not remain unscathed. East Asia’s financial 
ties with the US and EU have deepened since the 1998 crisis; cross-border bank flows into 
the region and corporate borrowing from international bond markets have both increased. 
Asian banks expanded their reliance on wholesale funding and the proportions of non-Asian 
equities and securities held by Asian residents have soared. Likewise, a large amount of 
capital from the US and EU has flowed into Asia for investment in equity markets.  Not 
surprisingly, when business confidence was shaken due to financial troubles in East Asia’s 
developed countries, investors started to withdraw their funds from the region as part of a 
de-leveraging process. The massive capital outflows in the region were visible in the 
precipitous falls in stock market values across the region—during the period from January to 
October 2008, the stock markets of Shanghai, Indonesia, and Thailand fell by 58.7%, 40.7%, 
and 37.3% respectively. 
The Asian financial crisis in 1997–1998 demonstrated the importance of the exchange rate 
in creating or ameliorating a crisis. In the current financial crisis, the impact of the exchange 
rate has been less severe than that experienced in 1997–1998, with the exception of 
Indonesia and the Republic of Korea. The won and the rupiah depreciated by about 20% 
and 10% in nominal effective terms between September 2008 and March 2009 (International 
Monetary Fund 2009). Bucking the trend, the Japanese yen has appreciated by about 25% 
in nominal terms during the same period, following the unwinding of carry trade positions 
and narrower interest rate differentials against key countries. Japan’s trade balance, which 
for the past thirty years had been in surplus, reversed because of a stronger yen and lower 
export earnings. The main currency problem East Asia has had during the global crisis so far 
has not been exchange rate volatility or sharp depreciation but a shortage of US dollars, 
especially in late 2008, which led to the difficulties faced by central banks and monetary 
authorities in meeting the demand for the US dollar. ADBI Working Paper 232    Abidin 
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3.  EAST ASIAN RESPONSE MEASURES 
Falling export revenues, the inability of the private sector to generate growth, and the fears 
of a prolonged contraction have led East Asian governments to take a leading role  in 
expanding domestic demand by introducing stimulus measures, as shown in Table 4. This 
strong public sector response is remarkable because of its unusually large size, scope, and 
number of countries involved. Japan has the largest stimulus package both in terms of total 
size and as a percentage of its GDP (US$568 billion), followed by the PRC (US$585 billion), 
and the Republic of Korea (US$84 billion). Malaysia and Singapore also had sizeable 
stimulus packages, indicating the severity of the economic contraction. Details of the 
individual stimulus measures are given in Table 5. As a result of the stimulus packages, East 
Asian government budget surpluses have deteriorated into deficits of between 2% and 8%. 




As a Percentage of 
2008 GDP 
PRC  585.0  13.3 
Indonesia  6.1  1.2 
Japan  568.0
a  11.5 
Republic of Korea  84.0  8.9 
Malaysia  18.1  8.1 
Philippines  6.5  3.9 
Singapore  13.8  7.6 
Thailand  3.3  1.2 
Viet Nam  1.0  1.1 
GDP = Gross Domestic Product. 
aThe figure quoted here for Japan’s stimulus package takes into account all four stimulus packages, but includes only 
the US$51 billion of new spending from the second stimulus package. 
Sources: The stimulus package amounts are taken from the Economic & Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 
and other official government websites. 2008 GDPs are from the International Monetary Fund country database. 
Japan announced a series of stimulus packages, which totaled 11.5% of its GDP. However, 
Japan’s announcement of its stimulus package may have been made less effective by the 
fact that it was injected in several small doses every three to four months. The first package 
was introduced in August 2008 and amounted to US$107.5 billion, which was equivalent to 
2.2% of Japan’s GDP. It was comprised of mainly non-spending measures such as lower 
road tolls, fuel subsidies, loans to businesses, assistance to farms, and help for part-time 
workers to find better jobs. 
The second stimulus package was announced in October 2008. From a total of US$275 
billion, US$51 billion was new spending. More than US$20 billion, or 40% of the total new 
spending, was a bank rescue plan; the other US$20 billion (40%) was issued in US$600 
handouts to every household of four. The third package amounted to US$255 billion, of 
which 44% (US$111 billion) was tax breaks, public financing, and corporate tax cuts from 
22% to 18% for small and medium enterprises (SMEs). The other 56% (US$144 billion) went 
to capital injections. A fourth package amounting to US$154.5 billion, equivalent to 3.2% of 
the GDP, was announced on 4 April 2009. The measures were aimed at stimulating the 
green economy, creating four million new jobs, and helping corporate finance. The package 
also involved strategies to reinforce Japan's competitiveness. 
Faced with an aging population and high public debt, Japan may have introduced 
substantially more non-spending measures in their stimulus packages. However, the 
government may face difficulties reversing those policy decisions, especially those to lower 
toll rates, provide fuel subsidies, and introduce corporate tax cuts for SMEs. The Japanese 
banking system is also one of the few in East Asia to be affected by the global financial ADBI Working Paper 232    Abidin 
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crisis, and part of the second stimulus package included US$20 billion in capital injection to 
stabilize the financial system. This raised controversies over the support for zombie banks 
that lend to inefficient sectors; a practice that is unlikely to lead the country out of recession. 
According to ADB, Japan’s fiscal deficit is expected to widen from 1.4% of the GDP in 2008 
to 6.8% of the GDP in 2009. 
On 22 October 2009, the new Japanese government under control of the Democratic Party 
of Japan retracted the use of about US$32 billion from the fourth US$154.5 billion stimulus 
package previously announced. It is likely that the money will be redirected toward 
alternative projects. 
The PRC announced the largest single fiscal stimulus package in November 2008, which 
was equivalent to 13.3% of its GDP. The PRC was the East Asian nation to spend the most 
on infrastructure. Slightly more than 86% of the PRC’s stimulus package went to 
infrastructure spending, out of which 45% was for road, rail, and airport  infrastructure 
(CNY1.8 trillion), 9.5% was for improving electricity, water, and road infrastructure in rural 
areas (CNY370 billion), 7% was for low income housing (CNY280 billion), and 24.7% was for 
the reconstruction of towns devastated by the May 12, 2008, earthquake. The remainder of 
the stimulus package went to healthcare and education (CNY40 billion or 1% of the total 
package), ecological and environmental protection (CNY350 billion or 8.8%), and technical 
innovation (CNY160 billion or 4%). 
It is not clear exactly how much of the PRC’s US$586 billion stimulus package was actually 
new spending and not just infrastructure plans that were brought forward in 2009. There is 
probably less contention on the long-term sustainability of the PRC’s fiscal deficit as the type 
of spending appears to be non-recurring reconstruction and infrastructure expenditure, 
although a smaller percentage of this may be needed for future maintenance. Despite its 
large fiscal stimulus, only 1% of the PRC’s stimulus package was allocated for irreversible 
spending on healthcare and education. In January 2009, however, the Government of the 
People’s Republic of China undertook a fiscal expenditure of US$124.3 billion and significant 
steps on healthcare reform were taken to provide basic medical security for all citizens, 
improve the quality of medical services, and make medical services more accessible. 
Although the PRC’s first stimulus package was large, its fiscal deficit remains relatively low 
within the region, rising from 0.4% in 2008 to 3.2% in 2009. 
The Republic of Korea announced three stimulus packages in quick succession (December 
2008, January 2009, and March 2009). The US$26 billion stimulus in December 2008 was 
called the “2009 Budget and Public Fund Operations Plan to Overcome Economic 
Difficulties”  and was focused on infrastructure. It included projects to advance the 
metropolitan economy and expand the provincial traffic network. The Republic of Korea’s 
second stimulus package was called the “Green New Deal Job Creation Plan” and it 
involved infrastructure spending on green transportation networks and clean water supplies, 
carbon reduction and stable supply of water resources, and new industrial and information 
infrastructure and technology development. 
For the third stimulus package, the Government of the Republic of Korea amended tax laws 
by including incentives for the restructuring of financially distressed companies, establishing 
a bank recapitalization fund, and providing investment incentives for Korean expatriates. 
Malaysia’s  first stimulus package (US$1.9 billion) was introduced in November 2008, 
followed by another (US$16.2 billion) in March 2009. Nearly 43% of the first package was for 
infrastructure, providing for the upgrade, repair, and maintenance of public amenities (such 
as schools, hospitals, roads, quarters for police and armed forces, and police stations), the 
building of more low-cost houses, improvements in public transport, and the implementation 
of broadband Internet access. 
Malaysia’s second stimulus package was 8.5 times larger than the first and equivalent to 
7.3% of its GDP. Nearly half (48%, RM25 billion) went to assist the private sector as bank ADBI Working Paper 232    Abidin 
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guarantees for SMEs. Another 32% went to infrastructure, but of this sum, a substantial 
portion went to maintenance rather than new spending on public facilities. Seventeen 
percent of the spending from the second stimulus was targeted at the vulnerable through 
food, toll, and fuel subsidies, and support for low-cost housing and for retrenched workers; 
while the remaining 3% was directed towards reducing unemployment and increasing job 
and training opportunities. Although a total sum of RM60 billion was announced for this 
second stimulus, the actual spending in 2009 and 2010 was only RM10 billion. Tax 
incentives amounted to RM3 billion and RM10 billion was for strategic investment by the 
national sovereign wealth fund. With the stimulus package relatively large compared to its 
GDP, Malaysia’s fiscal deficit is estimated to be much higher than the other countries in 
ASEAN, rising from 4.8% in 2008 to 7.6% in 2009. 
Singapore  introduced a US$13.8 billion stimulus package in January 2009. Twenty-one 
percent was for spending on public sector infrastructure such as on the Mass Rapid Transit 
system and road  network, basic amenities such as drainage and sewerage, and for 
education and health infrastructure. The spending is also intended to develop suburban 
nodes that will de-centralize economic activity and rejuvenate old public housing 
neighborhoods.  US$1 billion is targeted to be spent over the next five years on support 
programs for sustainable development initiatives focusing on energy efficiency for industry 
and households, green transport, clean energy, and the greening of living spaces. US$4 
billion is targeted for healthcare infrastructure. 
Twenty-five percent of Singapore’s stimulus package was spent on infrastructure, 12.5% on 
enhancing future capacity, 25% was spent as loan guarantees to SMEs, 12.5% was 
allocated as tax breaks in the form of corporate tax cuts and grants, and the balance was 
used to support households through personal income tax rebates and the securing of jobs by 
subsiding wages. Actual spending accounted for 62.5% of Singapore’s stimulus package. 
Singapore was able to draw from its S$300 billion reserves to meet its record S$20.5 billion 
(US$13.7 billion) spending. Even with this financial strength, Singapore will for the first time 
incur a fiscal deficit of 4.1% of its GDP in 2009. 
Indonesia  introduced a US$6.3 billion stimulus package in February 2009 amounting to 
1.2% of its GDP. From that, 16.6% was for spending on  infrastructure. The bulk of this 
stimulus (58.6%) was tax breaks for individuals and companies. Individual tax was lowered 
for workers having a monthly income of less than Rp5 million. Waived import duties and 
taxes comprised 18% of the package (Rp13.3 trillion), and diesel subsidies 3.8%.  The 
stimulus package is expected to increase the fiscal deficit of Indonesia from 0.1% in 2008 to 
over 2% of its GDP in 2009. 
The Philippines announced a US$6.5 billion package in January 2009 (3.9% of its GDP) 
that focused on infrastructure and social services, job generation, and increased social 
protection, especially in health and tax cuts for businesses and individuals. With this 
spending, the fiscal deficit of the Philippines is estimated to rise from 0.9% to 2.3% in 2009. 
Thailand  introduced  two stimulus packages, in January and then March 2009. The first 
US$3 billion package included infrastructure  measures; social safety nets for the 
unemployed, those working below a certain wage level (B15,000 per month), the elderly, and 
students; and tax measures to boost SMEs, the real estate sector, and the tourism industry. 
The second, US$42 billion stimulus will see 73% of the package spent on infrastructure, 
15% on farm irrigation, and 6% on increasing income and quality of life in the southern 
provinces. The government will source 39.2% from its budget, 17% from domestic 
borrowing, 27.1% from foreign borrowing, and 16.6% from other income sources. The two 
stimulus packages are estimated to increase the fiscal deficit from 1.1% in 2008 to over 6% 
of the GDP in 2009. 
Viet Nam announced its first stimulus package totaling US$960 million in December 2008, 
which included an interest subsidy on loans, a reduction in corporate income tax for SMEs, 
and exemptions for personal income tax. About 10% of the package was for small-scale ADBI Working Paper 232    Abidin 
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infrastructure programs for 61 of the poorest districts. In March 2009, Viet Nam proposed a 
second stimulus package totaling US$17.6 billion, but its relevance was called into question. 
Viet Nam grew in the first nine months of 2009 and the Government of Viet Nam expects its 
GDP growth rate to be between 5% and 5.5% in 2009. Discussions indicated that the 
second stimulus package, if any, would be smaller than the first, and on 30 October 2009, 
the Government of Viet Nam pledged to continue with a second stimulus package of US$8 
billion, equivalent to about 12% of 2008’s GDP. The bulk of this stimulus package will be for 
infrastructure and development projects while some measures will  be  in the form of tax 
breaks for enterprises and individuals as well as welfare spending. 
Table 5: Fiscal Stimulus Packages in East Asia 
Country  Measures Taken  Date Announced 
Japan 
•  Mainly non-spending measures such as lower road 
tolls, fuel subsidies, loans to businesses, assistance 
to farms, and help for part-time workers to find better 
jobs. 
First package: US$107.5 billion 
•  More than US$20 billion (40%) as bank rescue plan. 
Second package: US$51 billion out of US$275 billion 
as new spending 
•  US$20 billion (40%) in US$600 handouts to every 
household of four. 
•  $111 billion (44%) in tax breaks and public financing, 
e.g., corporate tax cut from 22% to 18% for SMEs. 
Third package: US$255 billion 
•  $144 billion (56%) in capital injections. 
•  Stimulation of green economy 
Fourth package: USD154.55 billion 
•  Creation of four million new jobs 
•  Help for corporate finance 
•  Strategies to reinforce Japan's competitiveness 
 






















• 45% for infrastructure including road, railway  and 
airports (CNY1.8 trillion) 
First package: USD585 billion 
• 9.3% for improving electricity, water,  and road 
infrastructure in rural areas (CNY370 billion) 
• 7% for low income housing (CNY280 billion) 
• 25% for post-earthquake reconstruction (CNY1 trillion) 
• 1% for healthcare and education (CNY40 billion) 
• 8.8% for ecological and environment protection 
(CNY350 billion) 
• 4% for technical innovation (CNY160 billion) 
• Scientific and technical innovation/upgrades 
Expedited US$87.8 billion investment spending 
• Healthcare reform to provide basic medical security 
for all citizens, improve the quality of medical services, 
and make medical services more accessible 
Fiscal expenditure US$124.3 billion 












12 January 2009 
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Country  Measures Taken  Date Announced 
Republic of 
Korea  • Create more jobs by providing better job training 
through the expansion of the  internship system, 
increase job positions for the underprivileged 
First package: US$26 billion 
• Increase welfare support to stabilize livelihoods of low 
income classes and support in reducing childcare 
costs 
• Increase social overhead capital investment with 
focus on investments in construction projects 
including projects to advance the metropolitan 
economy and expand the provincial traffic network 
• Support the stabilization of SMEs and financial 
markets by increasing SME guarantees 
• Support regional finances to offset reduced real estate 
tax 
 
• Energy conservation, recycling,  and clean energy 
development to build an energy-saving economy 
Second package: US$37 billion 
• Green transportation networks and clean water 
supplies to improve the environment and quality of life 
• Carbon reduction and stable supply of water 
resources 
• Building of industrial and information infrastructure 
and technology development for greater energy 
efficiency 
 
• Maintaining job security and revitalizing provincial 
economies and supporting industries with future 
growth potential 
Supplementary budget: US$21 billion 





























23 March 2009 
Singapore 
• Job Credit Scheme—cash transfers for employers to 
cover part of their wage bills and avoid massive lay-
offs 
Total package US$13.8bn 
• Special Risk Sharing Initiative—government 
guarantees working capital loans for individual firms to 
stimulate bank lending 
• Corporate tax cuts from 18% to 17% 
• Personal income tax rebates of 20% of taxes due 
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Country  Measures Taken  Date Announced 
Malaysia 
• Upgrade and repair of public amenities, rural roads, 
and  quarters for police and armed forces 
(RM1.5 million) 
First package: US$1.9 billion 
• Build low- and medium-cost houses (RM1.4 million) 
• Upgrade and maintain public transport (RM0.5 million) 
• Implement broadband Internet access (RM0.5 million) 
• Set up investment funds to attract private investments 
(RM1.6 million) 
• Skills training and youth program (RM0.6 million) 
• Pre-school education & grants to schools 
(RM0.4 million) 
• Reduce unemployment and increase employment 
opportunities (RM2 billion) 
Second package: USD16.2 billion 
• Ease the financial  burden of vulnerable groups 
(RM10 billion) 
• Assist the private sector in facing the crisis 
(RM29 billion) 
• Build capacity for the future (RM19 billion) 
 














10 March 2009 
Thailand 
• One-time living-cost allowance of B2,000 for those 
earning less than B 15,000 per month 
Supplementary budget: US$3.3 billion 
• Extension of five public service subsidies programs for 
6 month 
• Support given to unemployed workers 
• Free education for students 
• Sufficient Economy Fund for Improvement in Quality 
of Life fund for rural villages 
• Old-age support payment of B500 per month 
• Infrastructure projects 
• Tax measures to boost real estate, SMEs,  and the 
tourism industry 
 
• Seventy-three percent will be spent on infrastructure 
investments in mass transit, transportation, 
communication and energy. Fifteen percent  to 
improve farm irrigation and water supply.  The 
remainder is aimed at increasing the income and 
quality of life in the southern provinces (6.4%), 
improving education (3.8%), developing new sites, 
improvement of existing sites and rehabilitation 
projects for the tourism industry (1.2%), and public 
health service reform (0.6%). 
Strong Thailand 2012 scheme: US$42 billion 














24 March 2009 
Indonesia 
• Tax breaks for individuals and companies 
(Rp43 trillion) 
Total package: Rp73.3 trillion 
• Waived import duties and taxes (Rp13.3 trillion) 
• Infrastructure spending (Rp12.2 trillion) 
• Diesel subsidy (Rp2.8 trillion) 
• Rural schemes to generate employment (Rp2 trillion) 
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Country  Measures Taken  Date Announced 
Philippines 
• Infrastructure spending including repair of government 
buildings  and the  hiring  of  teachers, policemen, 
soldiers, and doctors (48%) 
Total package: US$6.5 billion 
• Job creation program to provide 824,000 temporary 
jobs in government departments by July 2009 (30%) 
• Tax reduction in corporate income tax and waiver of 
personal income tax for minimum wage earners (12%) 
• Expanding access to health services and waiver of 
penalties on loans from social security (9%) 
27 January 2009 
Viet Nam 
• 4% interest subsidy on loans to SMEs 
First stimulus package: US$1 billion 
• Reduction in corporate income tax for SMEs 
• Exemption on personal income tax from January  to 
May 2009 
• Infrastructure projects 
Second stimulus package: US$8 billion 
• Tax exemption for enterprises and individuals 







30 October 2009 
Source:  Economic & Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific and official government websites. 
3.1  Monetary Policy 
The most immediate response to the global financial crisis was for countries to reduce 
interest rates, lower the reserve and liquidity requirements for the banking sector, and to 
lend directly to financial institutions. In some cases, quantitative easing or the purchase of 
investment grade securities by monetary authorities was also carried out. These measures 
amounted to what was probably the most aggressive monetary easing ever undertaken and 
were justified by the need to avoid financial collapses, calm jittery credit markets, and avoid 
the onset of further economic recession. Studies by the International Monetary Fund, such 
as Rabanal (2004) and IMF World Economic Outlook (2008), suggest that monetary policies 
are effective and consistent in shortening the duration of recessions. With output growth 
plunging, there was also little fear of inflation or inflationary expectations building up and this 
gave rise to the opportunity. 
In East Asia, to increase liquidity and support domestic consumption, most countries have 
sharply cut their central bank or indicative interest rates. The interest rate cuts from their 
peak were mostly in excess of 200 basis points as shown in Table 6, with the exception of 
Japan, which had followed a course of very low interest rates for a long time and, therefore, 
had little room to maneuver. The Bank of Japan cut its key interest rate from 0.3% to 0.1% in 
December 2008, and it is now among the lowest of any economy. The Republic of Korea’s 
interest rate cuts were the most frequent and dramatic, having been adjusted downwards 
seven times starting in October 2008 and falling by a total of 325 basis points from the peak. 
In comparison, the cut by the PRC was less, dropping by 216 points to 5.3%. This has to be 
seen, however, in the context of the PRC’s still relatively robust economy and large fiscal 
stimulus plan. As of July 2009, virtually all the East Asian countries affected by the crisis are 
either at or near their historical lows. At these levels, there would appear to be much less 
scope for effective monetary policy, and no further interest rate cuts have been undertaken. 
The effects of these drastic interest rate cuts have yet to be ascertained because 
disappearing demand, rather than interest levels, is more likely to be the important 
determinant of demand for loans. The liquidity trap experience of Japan during the 1990s 
provides  an example of ineffective interest rate cuts in a situation of low business and 
consumer confidence. ADBI Working Paper 232    Abidin 
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Table 6: Monetary Policy Responses in East Asia, 4Q2008–2Q2009 
  Monetary Policy 




People’s Republic of 
China 
(216)  5.31 
Hong Kong, China  (625)  0.50 
Indonesia  (225)  7.25 
Japan  (40)  0.10 
Republic of Korea  (325)  2.00 
Malaysia  (150)  2.00 
Philippines  (175)  4.25 
Singapore  —  — 
Taipei,China  (237)  1.25 
Thailand  (250)  1.25 
Source: Author’s compilation using documents from the National Central Banks and Financial Authorities of the 
respective countries. 
4.  IMPLICATIONS OF STIMULUS PACKAGES ON PUBLIC 
SECTOR FISCAL BALANCE 
At the end of 2008, 11 out of 13 reporting East Asian economies had incurred fiscal 
deficits—the two exceptions being Singapore and the Republic of Korea (see Table 7). None 
of these deficits can be considered particularly serious—the highest was Malaysia’s deficit of 
4.8% of its GDP, and only four of the deficits were higher than those in 2007. In comparison, 
all 13 East Asian economies are expected to post fiscal deficits in 2009. In six of these 
cases, the projected deficits are 5% or more, and all of these may rise further if aggregate 
output continues to lag and more public spending is implemented. 
 ADBI Working Paper 232    Abidin 
 
 13 
Table 7: Government Budget Surpluses/Deficits (Percentage of Gross Domestic Product), 1990–2009 
Year  Brunei 
Darussalam 
Cambodia  PRC  Hong 
Kong, 




Malaysia  Myanmar  Philippines  Singapore  Thailand  Taipei,China  Viet 
Nam 
China 
1990  (0.3)  (4.5)  (2.8)  0.7  (0.8)  (0.5)  (0.6)  (9.7)  (2.9)  (2.8)  (3.5)  10.8  4.8  1.8  (7.2) 
1991  (1.6)  (3.4)  (3.0)  3.3  (0.7)  (0.4)  (1.5)  (6.1)  (2.0)  (3.7)  (2.1)  —  4.3  (2.2)  (0.7) 
1992  (3.9)  (3.6)  —  2.7  (1.1)  (2.4)  (0.5)  (5.2)  (0.8)  (2.1)  (1.2)  —  2.6  (5.3)  (0.8) 
1993  (0.7)  (4.7)  —  2.1  (0.5)  (3.6)  0.6  (2.7)  0.2  (1.4)  (1.5)  —  1.9  (3.8)  (3.4) 
1994  15.5  (5.7)  —  1.0  1.0  (4.3)  0.3  (11.1)  2.3  (2.5)  1.0  —  2.7  (1.7)  (2.2) 
1995  15.1  (7.2)  —  (0.3)  2.2  (4.4)  0.3  (12.9)  0.8  (3.3)  0.6  14.5  3.0  (1.1)  (1.3) 
1996  0.5  (6.2)  (1.8)  2.1  1.0  (4.0)  0.2  (5.7)  0.7  (2.2)  0.3  —  0.9  (1.4)  (0.9) 
1997  1.7  (0.9)  (1.9)  6.4  0.5  (3.5)  (1.4)  (5.2)  2.4  (0.1)  0.1  —  (1.5)  (1.6)  (3.9) 
1998  5.4  (2.4)  (2.4)  (1.8)  (1.7)  (10.7)  (3.9)  (6.6)  (1.8)  0.8  (1.9)  —  (2.8)  0.1  (1.6) 
1999  (1.4)  (1.2)  (3.0)  0.8  (2.5)  (7.3)  (2.5)  (2.5)  (3.2)  (0.3)  (3.8)  —  (3.3)  (1.2)  (3.3) 
2000  10.9  (2.1)  (2.8)  (0.6)  (1.1)  (6.4)  1.1  (4.3)  (5.5)  0.7  (4.0)  10.0  (2.2)  (4.6)  (4.3) 
2001  0.4  (3.1)  (2.5)  (4.9)  (2.4)  (6.0)  1.2  (4.2)  (5.2)  —  (4.0)  —  (2.4)  (6.4)  (3.5) 
2002  (9.9)  (3.4)  (2.6)  (4.8)  (1.5)  (6.8)  3.3  (3.2)  (5.3)  —  (5.3)  —  (1.4)  (2.9)  (2.3) 
2003  (1.7)  (4.0)  (2.2)  (3.2)  (1.7)  (6.6)  1.1  (5.4)  (5.0)  —  (4.6)  3.1  0.4  (2.3)  (2.2) 
2004  13.5  (2.0)  (1.3)  1.7  (1.0)  (5.2)  0.7  (2.4)  (4.1)  —  (3.8)  4.1  0.1  (2.5)  0.2 
2005  25.2  (0.5)  (1.2)  1.0  (0.5)  (6.1)  0.4  (4.3)  (3.6)  —  (2.7)  6.8  (0.6)  (0.3)  (1.1) 
2006  12.8  (0.8)  (0.8)  4.0  (0.9)  (1.1)  0.4  (3.2)  (3.3)  —  (1.1)  6.7  1.1  (0.2)  (1.8) 
2007  —  (1.2)  0.7  7.2  (1.2)  —  3.8  (2.7)  (3.2)  —  (0.2)  —  (1.7)  —  (5.4) 
2008  —  (2.2)  (0.4)  (0.3)  (0.1)  (1.4)  0.3  (1.8)  (4.8)  —  (0.9)  1.5  (1.1)  (1.3)  (1.6) 
2009  —  (4.8)  (3.2)  (4.1)  (2.1)  (6.8)  (6.5)  (5.4)  (7.6)  —  (2.3)  (4.1)  (6.0)  (5.0)  (4.0) 
(est.) 
Est. = Estimated, PRC = People’s Republic of China, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
Source: Asian Development Bank Key Indicators 2008 and The Economist’s Country Profiles. ADBI Working Paper 232    Abidin 
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Some countries could face difficulties in financing their fiscal stimulus because they had 
persistent fiscal deficits prior to the crisis. However, the mere existence of fiscal deficits does 
not necessarily indicate that there is a problem. Fiscal imbalances must be viewed in 
conjunction with other macroeconomic targets such as output growth, inflation, balance of 
payments, and currency stability. An economy that has such an imbalance but shows no 
sign of over-heating or financing difficulties  cannot be considered to be troublesome. 
Whether these deficits are rising or falling is also of great interest, especially for investors 
who are always on the lookout for falling interest rates and strengthening exchange rates. 
Another important factor in assessing the desirability of fiscal deficits is the prevailing level of 
public debt. International Monetary Fund studies have found that the higher the level of 
public debt, the lower the effectiveness of fiscal policy and vice versa. This is intuitive given 
the fact that the crowding out effect is more likely to be greater at high rather than low levels 
of debt. The ability to service external debt and holdings of foreign reserves is another 
common indicator of fiscal sustainability. Economies that have internationally tradable 
currencies are also more likely to have fiscal deficits than those that do not. 
In short, fiscal deficits must be viewed against the entire backdrop of economic data and not 
just in isolation. More importantly, it is critical to note that economies do not all have identical 
capacities to run such deficits. In general, East Asian countries have relatively low public 
debt (Table 8). Countries like Japan can regularly incur deficits of over 6% because of their 
other inherent financial strengths such as their strong export revenues and profitable private 
sectors, while those like Indonesia cannot. The PRC can add fiscal stimulus equal to 13% of 
its GDP and still end up running a deficit of only around 3.5%. The PRC’s ability to finance 
this is not in question because of its strong exports and accumulated foreign reserves. The 
same, however, is not true of Cambodia. 
Table 8: Public Debt to Gross Domestic Product Ratio for  
Select East Asian Countries, 2008 (%) 
Country  Ratio 
People’s Republic of 
China  15.70% 
Hong Kong, China   14.50% 
Indonesia  30.10% 
Japan  170.40% 
Republic of Korea  32.70% 
Malaysia  42.77% 
Philippines  56.50% 
Singapore  113.70% 
Thailand  42.00% 
Viet Nam  38.60% 
Source: CIA World Factbook. 
The central issue, therefore, is how East Asian economies are able to finance an increasing 
amount of infrastructure spending, and  the resulting  fiscal deficits, in ways that are 
considered to be wholly prudent and productive. The case of Thailand and Viet Nam is a 
good illustration of this challenge. If a country has a high public debt the additional public 
spending could be seen as undesirable and lead to the disinvestment, capital flight, and 
currency instability that has afflicted many countries in the developing world in the past. 
Financing of the fiscal deficit should not be confined to macroeconomic policies. The 
development of domestic private sector and financial institutions also has a vital role to play. 
Recessions have an immediate impact on a government’s fiscal position through automatic 
stabilizers, other non-discretionary effects such as lower commodity prices,  and 




stabilizers, which are computed on the basis of changes in the output gap, and negatively 
impact the fiscal position. The International Monetary Fund (2009) estimated that a uniform 
1% point of GDP worsening in the Group of Twenty economies translates into a 0.3% GDP 
increase in the fiscal deficit. In fact, the report also estimated that the emerging countries of 
the Group of Twenty will have a deficit of 1.1% of their GDP in 2009, compared to 0.1% 
surplus in 2008. The non-discretionary effects will come through lower tax revenues as 
private sector profits decline. The discretionary responses to the crisis can have either a 
temporary or a  permanent effect. Most of the discretionary measures responding to the 
crisis are for infrastructure projects or specific transfers to help the lower income groups, and 
they have no permanent effects on the fiscal balance. Only a few countries have introduced 
measures such as tax cuts that permanently reduce the government revenue capacity. As 
such, the overall medium- and long-term impact of the present response measures has not 
adversely affected the fiscal position of East Asia. 
In the case of Malaysia, policy has been deliberately made conservative by ensuring that a 
major part of the financing requirements  comes from internally-generated funds and that 
there is not a high reliance on external borrowings. Debt service ratios have therefore tended 
to be modest, and the government has further actively managed external debt by using 
opportunities of currency strength to prepay or retire foreign loans. Malaysia has also worked 
to ensure that there is no excessive build-up of short-term debt, which is risky, and that there 
are strong efforts to attract foreign direct investment. 
One way to finance these fiscal stimuli is to utilize funding from domestic resources, and the 
experience of Malaysia is worthy of note. In the 1990s, Malaysia’s privatization policy was 
pursued in earnest meaning that the government was able to earn revenue from asset sales, 
while transferring much of the responsibility and the development and operating costs to the 
private sector. Initially, privatization agreements had to be made appealing in order to ensure 
adequate private sector participation. Subsequent to this, and with a more developed private 
sector, the government has been able to pursue private finance initiatives, which are more 
stringent performance-based arrangements and more  along the lines of public–private 
partnerships. 
The capital market is another important source from which to raise funds. The development 
of Malaysia’s capital market over the past 25 years has been an integral component of its 
ability to finance public infrastructure. As in most developing economies, the market for long-
term funding was originally dominated by government securities, with equity issues playing 
only a small role. As the economy became more sophisticated and with more privatized 
infrastructure projects in the pipeline, the market for equities and private debt securities 
emerged and grew rapidly. This has enabled fiscal policy to be pursued more efficiently than 
would otherwise have been the case. 
Given that not all economies have the same ability to sustain and finance fiscal deficits, any 
regional infrastructure financing arrangement would seem to need to provide access to a 
source of internationally traded currencies on both competitive and concessionary terms. 
During the Asian Financial Crisis of 1998, for example, Japan’s “New Miyazawa Initiative” 
provided useful and timely funding for the affected countries. A total of US$30 billion was 
made available—US$15 billion for medium-  to long-term financial needs for economic 
recovery, while the other US$15 billion was for short-term capital needs during the process 
of implementing economic reforms. Likewise, the Japan International Cooperation Agency’s 
assistance of over JPY120 billion given to Indonesia in 2008–2009 has provided important 
economic growth stimulus at a critical time. 
Countries that have the ability, however, should be able to draw on financing sources on a 
more flexible and efficient basis. It would be particularly helpful if the financing arrangement 
could be tailored to meet two particular needs of infrastructure. The first of these is duration 
mismatch or the difference between the period of investment (which in the case of 




need to hedge currency risks or the potential losses between the home currency and the 
currency in which the financing is denominated. Financing arrangements that are able to 
assist in resolving these two problems would greatly enhance the viability and sustainability 
of infrastructure projects and would help in financing the higher fiscal deficits that will be 
incurred. 
5.  WHY DOES EAST ASIA NEED TO INVEST IN 
INFRASTRUCTURE? 
5.1  Basis for future high growth 
Despite the strong economic development achieved by Asia in the last decade, there are 
many people still living in poverty. Infrastructure spending has the intention of creating an 
economic spin-off, thus helping countries grow out of the crisis. According to a projection of 
infrastructure needs, low-income countries should increase infrastructure stocks by 2.3% 
each year until 2010, while middle-income countries and high-income countries should 
increase infrastructure stocks by 3.5% and 1.4%, respectively (Fay and Yepes 2003). 
World Bank studies have concluded that if Africa had matched the infrastructure growth 
rates of East Asia in the 1980s and 1990s, then it could have had 1.3% higher annual 
economic growth. According to Richards (2008), Latin America witnessed 1% to 3% lower 
long-term growth because it invested less in infrastructure. At the 2007 World Economic 
Forum’s Indian Economic Summit held in New Delhi, infrastructure analysts estimated that 
the lack of infrastructure is holding back India’s economic growth by 1.5% to 2% a year 
(World Economic Forum 2007). Infrastructure in many studies is used as an input that will 
raise productivity and output and deliver economic growth (Gramlich 1994; Neill 1996). The 
recent growth of East Asia is generally attributed to a successful export model, but it has 
also relied on effective infrastructure, particularly logistics and distribution. 
Export activities in East Asia are a good transportation system. Developing logistics 
infrastructure in Asia will further increase intra-regional trade. This is because, based on 
freight costs and service levels, a number of developing countries in Asia are actually closer 
to developed countries in terms of economic distance than to their regional neighbors 
Regional infrastructure will lower the costs of East Asian intra-regional trade. The case for 
investment in logistics infrastructure is further supported by a multi-country study showing 
that a 20% reduction in logistics costs would increase the trade-to-GDP ratio by more than 
10% in Cambodia, PRC, and Lao PDR; by more than 15% in Mongolia; and by more than 
20% in Papua New Guinea. 
Investment in logistics infrastructure fosters economic growth, as long as parallel 
improvements in the information and communication technologies (ICT) infrastructure are 
made. Colecchia and Schreyer (2001) confirmed that ICT contributes to economic growth in 
both developing and developed countries. It does this by raising productivity and improving 
the efficiency of individuals, firms, sectors, and the economy as a whole. In particular, the 
adoption of ICT creates unprecedented opportunities for businesses in developing countries 
to overcome the constraints of limited access to resources and markets. SMEs can get 
better access to trade finance and e-finance through improved credit and e-credit 
information. ICT also lowers transaction costs and facilitates trade, thus opening up new 
international business opportunities and increasing the participation of developing countries 
in the information economy.  Alongside greater levels of trade, outsourcing and foreign 
investment coming into Asia from developed countries—and increasingly from developing 
countries as well—also increases. Developing better ICT literacy and infrastructure can help 
countries improve competitiveness and attract more offshoring activities that add value to the 




5.2  Recycling Asian international reserves and domestic savings 
The export-led growth model pursued by Asia has led to the  accumulation of large 
international reserves, as shown in Table 9. These reserves grew strongly after the Asian 
financial crisis  of  1997–1998  as insurance against  further currency attacks and financial 
crises (Aizenman 2007). The accumulation of large foreign exchange reserves is due to the 
trade surpluses the region sustained, although there are claims that the East Asian countries 
had not allowed their currencies to appreciate in order to keep exports competitive. The 
extent of the accumulation of foreign exchange reserves by countries in the region is more 
than merely adequate. At the end of 2006, the reserves of PRC; Hong Kong, China; India; 
Republic of Korea;  Malaysia;  Singapore;  and  Taipei,China  were  many times more than 
needed to cover their external debt (Park 2007). However, not all reserves can be spent. 
Examples are the reserves from central banks or those arising from borrowing overseas, 
which are not for disposal, despite their accumulation, because they  have counterpart 
liabilities. 
A significant part of the accumulated foreign exchange reserves under central bank 
management is invested in the US dollar. Figure 1 shows that 61% of the emerging and 
developing economies’ reserves were US dollar denominated assets. As of 31 May 2009, 
East Asian countries hold 15.7% of the total Special Drawing Rights available, at an interest 
rate of 0.35%. There have been calls for East Asia to recycle its huge foreign exchange 
reserves for investment in the region, including in infrastructure, so that they can be used to 
support further economic growth in the region and bring in higher returns. 
Table 9: Gross International Reserves 
(US$ billions) 
Country  2004  2005  2006  2007  2008 
Brunei Darussalam  0.51  0.49  0.52  0.61  0.65 
Cambodia  0.81  0.92  1.10  1.61  2.29 
PRC  614.50  821.51  1,068.49  1,540.00  1,980.00 
Hong Kong, China  123.57  124.28  133.20  152.69  182.54 
Indonesia  36.32  34.72  42.59  56.92  51.64 
Republic of Korea  199.07  210.39  238.96  262.22  201.22 
Lao PDR  0.22  0.23  0.33  0.54  0.62 
Malaysia  66.24  70.18  82.24  101.52  89.76 
Myanmar  0.87  1,026.00  2.50  3.64  — 
Philippines  16.23  18.49  22.97  33.75  37.55 
Singapore  112.58  116.17  136.26  162.96  174.20 
Taipei,China  241.74  253.29  266.15  270.31  291.71 
Thailand  49.83  52.07  66.99  87.46  111.00 
Viet Nam  6.31  8.56  11.48  21.00  23.00 
PRC = People’s Republic of China, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 




Figure 1: Composition of Foreign Exchange Reserves for Emerging and Developing 
Economies (as at 31 May 2009) 
 
Source: Currency Composition of Official Foreign Exchange Reserves Database, International Monetary Fund. 
5.3  Narrowing the developmental gap between countries in the 
region 
Investment in infrastructure has the additional benefits of helping to close the income gap 
and reducing poverty because low-income countries and areas will have a better chance of 
generating higher economic activities when infrastructure is available. Infrastructure 
development can connect the agricultural and poorer areas to urban and economic growth 
hubs, which will enable the former to market their products and receive their economic 
needs at reasonable prices. Transportation and energy projects are an effective way for 
development to reach the poorer regions of East Asia. Sixty percent of the region’s 
population lives in the countryside, which is where poverty tends to be concentrated. In rural 
areas, an inadequate and unstable power supply, inefficient transport systems, poor-quality 
roads, weak and aged railroad systems, badly equipped and congested ports and airports, 
and unreliable communications systems raise transaction costs, curtail productivity, and 
often render investments unviable. Transport and energy supply improvements have been 
shown to reduce poverty in rural areas. Improvements in rural transport are associated with 
falling costs; increased income from agriculture; increased access to employment, education 
health, and social participation; and even better emergency relief in the event of natural 
disaster (Cook et al. 2004). 
Investment in energy infrastructure can increase access to electricity to support the 
increasing population. Increased electrification of rural areas helps to reduce poverty and 
helps the area move closer to achieving the Millennium Development Goals (Cook et al. 
2004; Estache 2004). Rural populations benefit from the reduced energy costs, increased 
farming activity, better quality of education and health services, increased flow of information, 
and improved security that all come from rural electrification. However, there are climate 
change and environment considerations. If the developing Asian countries generate and use 




related carbon dioxide emissions, or 43% of the world’s emissions from energy use (Asian 
Development Bank 2009). Therefore, it is essential that infrastructure investment strategies 
address the balance between a higher level of development and environmental protection. 
Increasing Asian urbanization will also call for infrastructure investment. In 2006, developing 
countries such as Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Thailand had already reached more 
than  30% urban population.  With increasing migration to cities, the incidence of urban 
poverty will rise, as will stress on the water supply, sanitation system, and transport network. 
Infrastructure spending in these areas will continue to be needed. 
6.  INFRASTRUCTURE IN ASIA 
6.1  Asian infrastructure needs 
East Asia has made great progress with its infrastructure, especially in its more developed 
countries—Kumar and De (2008) show that the level and rank of East Asia infrastructure is 
comparable to the US between 1991 and 2005. For example, in 2005, out of the top 10 
countries with the highest ranked infrastructure, eight were from East Asia. However, there is 
still a huge unfulfilled need for basic infrastructure in the emerging East Asian countries, and 
also for advanced types of infrastructure to support higher level economic activities. Yepes 
(2004) estimated that East Asia needed US$107.1 billion of investment for new infrastructure 
and US$57.9 billion for maintenance as shown in Table 10. This is likely to be an 
underestimation because ADB estimated that the region actually requires US$3,042 billion of 
infrastructure for the period 2006–2015. In its latest estimate, ADB projected that East Asia 
and the Pacific needs a total of US$4,670 billion for their infrastructures between 2010 and 
2020  (Asian Development Bank Institute 2009).  ASEAN countries alone need about 
US$583.1 billion of infrastructure investment in power plants, transportation, water and 
sanitation, and telecommunication for the same period consisting of US$382.6 billion (66%) 
for building new capacity and US$200.5 billion (34%) for maintenance (Table 11). A 
disturbing trend is that although in general ASEAN countries have improved their 
infrastructure, the gaps between countries are growing. 
Table 10: Infrastructure Investment and Maintenance Needs in East Asia, 2006–2010 
(US$ millions) 
Type  Investment  Maintenance  Total 
Electricity  63,466  25,744  89,190 
Telecom  13,800  10,371  24,171 
Road  23,175  10,926  34,102 
Rail  1,170  1,598  2,768 
Water  2,571  5,228  7,799 
Sanitation  2,887  4,131  7,107 
Total  107,049  57,998  165,047 




Table 11: Projected Infrastructure Requirements in ASEAN 2006–2015 Base Case 
(US$ billions) 
  New Capacity  Maintenance  Total 
Power  170.3  46.0  216.3 
Transport  95.6  61.2  156.8 
Water & Sanitation  98.8  60.6  146.4 
Telecom  30.9  32.7  63.6 
Total  382.6  200.5  583.1 
ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations. 
Source: Nangia 2008. 
Actual infrastructure development in East Asia is unlikely to match the needs outlined above. 
Estimates by ADB (Nangia 2008) on private sector investments for eight ASEAN countries 
from 1990 to 2006 showed a total invested amount of only US$163.6 billion, which implied a 
substantial under-investment (Table 12). The level of investment was very much linked to 
the state of these countries’ development: the largest private investment was in Malaysia 
(US$49.1 billion), followed by Philippines (US$38.1 billion), Indonesia (US$37.2 billion), and 
Thailand (US$30.7 billion). Investment in Cambodia, Lao PDR, Myanmar, and Viet Nam was 
much smaller. To bridge the gap, the most important sources of financing for governments 
are borrowing from existing multilateral institutions (such as ADB  and  World Bank) and 
bilateral government assistance or loan agencies (such as the Japan Bank for International 
Cooperation [JBIC]). However, the annual average total funding received by developing 
countries in the period 2000–2003 for infrastructure investment from ADB, World Bank, and 
JBIC was only US$7 billion (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for East Asia 
and the Pacific 2006). This represented less than 5% of the gap. 
Table 12: Private Sector Investments in ASEAN 1990–2006 (US$ millions) 
  Energy  Transport  Water & Sanitation  Telecom  Total 
Cambodia  231  445  —  331  1,007 
Indonesia  13,160  4,634  992  18,455  37,241 
Lao PDR  2,586  —  —  198  2,784 
Malaysia  14,313  16,113  10,144  8,577  49,147 
Myanmar  719  50  —  —  769 
Philippines  15,818  2,625  8,071  11,545  38,059 
Thailand  12,244  3,576  596  14,254  30,669 
Viet Nam  2,715  115  213  946  3,989 
Total  61,786  27,558  20,016  54,306  163,669 
ASEAN = Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic. 
Source: Nangia 2008. 
Besides national projects, East Asia also needs to invest in cross-border infrastructure, 
which involves more than one country. There is no estimate of East Asia’s cross-border 
infrastructure needs, but it is likely to be a smaller  share of the latest ADB  estimate of 
US$4,670 billion, which covers all of East Asia and the Pacific’s infrastructure requirements 
(most of them are national projects). Sometimes, national infrastructure projects are 
meaningless if they are not connected with the appropriate infrastructure that may be located 
in other countries. For example, transporting goods from a land-locked country needs cross-
border road links via other countries to reach the port where the goods can be shipped. 
Cross-border infrastructure allows the efficient movement of goods by complementing and 
linking the various infrastructure nodes located in the countries involved, and this is 




very different levels of development and cross border projects will help the transfer of trade, 
people, and skills in both directions and participating nations will create the potential for 
economic and human capital advantage. 
6.2  Existing regional and cross border infrastructure projects 
Regional and cross-border infrastructure projects are defined as projects that involve 
physical construction work and/or coordinated policies and procedures spanning two or more 
neighboring countries, or national infrastructure projects that have a significant cross-border 
impact (Asian Development Bank Institute 2009). 
East Asia has a limited number of cross-border infrastructure projects. The relatively low 
number of projects points to the difficulties in their implementation:  availability of funds, 
regulatory compatibility, implementation capacity, the sharing of costs and benefit, and 
political willingness. The following are important cross-border infrastructure projects: 
•  The Greater Mekong Sub-region—The GMS comprises Cambodia, two provinces 
of the PRC, Lao PDR, Myanmar, Thailand, and Viet Nam. One of the main focuses 
of the GMS program is to improve connectivity in the sub-region through the 
strengthening of linkages in transport, energy, and telecommunication. Key 
activities include the development of economic corridors: roads to improve access, 
institutional and policy support for trade facilitation, and transit policy harmonization 
to reduce logistics costs across the sub-region. Five economic corridors (two 
north–south, one east–west, and two southern) were identified, and several road 
investments have begun. Trade and transit harmonization is a key element, 
bringing to the GMS program  both the hardware and software components of 
infrastructure development. 
•  The Asian Highway and the Trans-Asian Railway network—These networks are 
part of the existing pan-Asian infrastructure initiative called the Asian Land 
Transport Infrastructure Development Project, which was established in 1992 by 
the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific. The 
main goal of this initiative is to improve economic links among Asian countries 
through better and increased connectivity. Its other pillar is the facilitation of land 
transport projects through intermodal transport terminals. One of the biggest 
challenges is to integrate the various modes of transportation including highway, 
railway, and air transport. 
•  ASEAN Power Grid Project—This project to develop interconnection of the power 
grid is implemented through cooperative agreement between the power 
utilities/authorities of the ASEAN countries. There are 14 interconnections, of 
which two have been completed and are currently operating. They are known as 
the Peninsular Malaysia–Thailand Interconnection and the Peninsular Malaysia–
Singapore Interconnection. 
•  Trans-ASEAN Gas Pipeline—This project has the aims  of providing ASEAN 
members with a reliable gas supply, the use of environmentally friendly fuel, and 
increased investment in gas exploration. It has eight gas interconnections involving 
Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and 
Viet Nam. 
•  Singapore–Kunming Rail Link project—This 7,000 km railway line, implemented 
under the ASEAN–Mekong Basin Development Cooperation Initiative, is expected 
to connect major cities in eight countries, namely,  Cambodia, PRC, Lao PDR, 




6.3  Mechanisms for funding cross-border infrastructure projects 
The major vehicles for funding cross-border infrastructure are multilateral agencies (primarily 
ADB), bilateral development aid programs, and government-owned financial agencies (e.g., 
JBIC). ADB has taken a leading role in promoting cross-border infrastructure because of its 
mission as a regional development finance institution. Besides its funding capability, ADB 
also has the technical capacity to plan, design, implement, and monitor the progress of 
projects. Most importantly, it can coordinate and work with the various Asian governments 
and regulators to ensure the project’s smooth execution. The United Nations Economic and 
Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific and the World Bank are the other multilateral 
agencies active in promoting region-wide infrastructure development. However, their funding 
mandate for infrastructure is limited because they have other projects to finance. Moreover, 
because of the generally high cost of cross-border projects, these agencies cannot afford to 
finance many of them. 
Bilateral assistance programs are another source of funding for cross-border infrastructure 
investment. The Government of Japan, through its ODA programs and the JBIC, has been 
particularly active and has been part of the GMS. Recently, the Japanese government 
proposed the “Growth Initiative towards Doubling the Size of Asia’s Economy.” The initiative 
proposes to develop the GMS as Asia’s growth pole, to link East Asia and Southeast Asia to 
India and strengthen the existing GMS development. The core of the proposal is the 
promotion of sub-regional development, in particular, cross-border infrastructure with a 
larger participation by the private sector. 
This proposal set out strategies to link sub-regional infrastructure with industrial development 
and mechanisms to facilitate public–private partnerships. It plans to develop the Mekong–
India Economic Corridor and link Thailand’s present Eastern Seaboard Development and the 
proposed Southern Seaboard Development to this new corridor. The existing GMS corridors 
will also be linked. A new mechanism to encourage private sector participation thorough a 
public–private partnership based on the Eastern Seaboard Development model will be 
proposed.  The Economic Research Institute for ASEAN and East Asia, ADB, and the 
ASEAN Secretariat are expected to work together to design the master plan of this proposal. 
For this purpose, the Government of Japan has increased its ODA budget to US$20 billion 
and another US$20 billion is allocated for a new line of trade insurance for infrastructure 
development. 
7.  CHALLENGES TO INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT 
The large shortfall between the demand for infrastructure projects and those that are 
successfully implemented shows that there are many challenges facing such projects. So 
often they fail or at least have limited success in meeting their goals. Many attempts are 
made to assign reasons for the failure with a view to avoiding future pitfalls, but these 
exercises are not always successful—so many factors and players are involved that any 
post-project evaluation findings are generally equivocal if not outright disputed. 
Against that background, if the project is also to span more than one country and to have a 
strong government interest, there are sure to be many new dimensions with a negative 
potential. The issues noted below are those thought to be more prominent in cross-border 
infrastructure projects, but they are also encountered to some degree in large national 
infrastructure development programs. 
•  Funding of infrastructure projects 
Governments may be able to finance their national infrastructure projects, but public 
sector funds are insufficient to finance cross-border projects because of their immense 




traditional funding sources because there are many, and sometimes more urgent 
demands for the use of a government’s resources. Multilateral institutions would usually 
fill in this funding gap, but their funding capacity is also finite because they depend on 
limited contributions from members, there is a higher cost of funds if raised through the 
market, and there are competing allocations to other various projects. Efforts to promote 
private sector participation require  measures to provide assurance that the private 
sector’s participation will produce an acceptable rate of return. The private sector often 
requests government financial guarantees of minimum returns or a subsidy to lower the 
cost of funds. This situation is harder for cross-border projects because of the difficulty to 
apportion  the burden of guarantees among governments. Without guarantees or soft 
loans to the private sector, the cost of the projects may be too high and the government 
may not be able to fully recover the costs from the users of the infrastructure. In such 
cases, the government may have to absorb part of the costs, which will depend on its 
fiscal position. The option for cost recovery by divestment of government equity holdings 
through public offerings also has its limitations. The medium- and long-term nature of 
projects carries higher risks than usually associated with normal projects and as such 
may not be too attractive to investors. In view of the points above, the private sector will 
find it very difficult to lead such projects, but may become involved as a sub-contractor. 
In that case, a valuable (maybe irreplaceable) management contribution will not be 
available to the project, thereby reducing its chance of success. Government guarantees 
from all sides, perhaps in the form of a joint commitment (if two countries are involved) or 
several commitments (if more than two countries are involved) will be a necessary (but 
not sufficient) contribution to cross-border infrastructure projects. 
 
Besides financing issues, the low rate of private sector participation is due to a lack of 
bankable projects, which limits the choice of projects that can be undertaken by the 
private sector based on the usual business criteria. Therefore, due to their nature as 
public goods, infrastructure projects cannot charge the public on a full cost recovery, but 
instead the government or the public sector has to include an element of subsidy for the 
project to be viable. 
 
•  Distribution of gains and costs 
Countries in East Asia are at different levels of development and have differing 
infrastructure needs. The costs and benefits to countries participating in cross-border 
infrastructure projects may differ widely. Countries have varying financial capacities to 
fund and participate in cross-border infrastructure projects and this situation becomes 
more complicated when the distribution of the gains does not match their share of the 
project costs. For example, in a hydroelectric power generation and distribution project, 
the cost is highest at the point of generating the electricity, namely, building the dam and 
generation plant. However, because the dam is situated in a location that is determined 
by geographical features, the dam may be far from the area that is the putative user of 
the power. That area may lie over the border in another country. The overall project 
design needs to balance the needs of each participant country. Each has to see an 
advantage that plays to its existing economic strength. This is important so that the 
project can be explained in the domestic political forum as providing a local benefit. In 
short, the project’s concept has to be Win–Win. Such projects are not easy to develop, 
especially if adjacent countries are at very different levels of economic development. 
 
Another aspect of this sharing of costs and benefits has to do with the spillover effects of 
the construction work for the projects. It is not uncommon for countries that provide 
funding for infrastructure projects through soft loans to make it a condition of the loan 
that the construction work be undertaken by companies from their own country. There 
are concerns that the contract terms, especially the costs, favor the contractors. Often, 




there are comparable materials available locally. Local companies may not get the full 
benefit because their role in the construction work and in supplying material is 
supplanted in many cases by imports. 
 
•  Regulatory and legal risks 
Since cross-border projects can involve regulations and legal procedures from different 
countries, a serious challenge is how to establish a set of rules and protocols that are 
acceptable to all. When more than one set of regulations and protocols has to be 
considered, the level of complexity rises. In addition, there is little precedent to follow, so 
the means of implementing and controlling each project has to be decided on a case-by-
case basis. The project organization or institute tasked with drafting the project 
documentation or arbitrating the competing demands cannot follow an agreed custom 
and practice if one does not exist. Equally important is the need to agree on a dispute 
settlement mechanism to deal with implementation matters and issues that may arise 
after the completion of the project. 
 
In Asia, institutions set up under regional infrastructure cooperation have been ad hoc. 
Very often, projects fail or are held up, raising costs significantly, because negotiations 
between governments at the regional and sub-national levels have failed. The 
harmonization of technical standards is also important to ensure the success of the 
project. A technical group established for this purpose is critical in reaching an 
agreement on the common standards acceptable by all countries. Agreement on 
technical standards is perhaps easier to achieve than that on regulatory and legal 
matters. 
 
•  Political risk 
Since infrastructure projects span a long period of time, changes in governments or 
policies may alter the projects’ terms and conditions. This is particularly relevant for 
projects involving sensitive issues such as toll collections and land use by external 
parties because for these, the government has to win popular support. Hence, a new 
ruling government may want to alter the terms and conditions agreed by the previous 
government if they are found to be unsuitable. While the regulatory and legal risks are 
capable of resolution by rational means, and commercial disagreement referred to an 
appointed arbitrator, a project may fall victim to a political issue that is quite unrelated to 
the project itself. For cross-border projects, the risk may be compounded if the project is 
part of a wider dialogue between the participating countries meaning that the project may 
no longer be assessed on its own merits. Politicians may employ the project as part of a 
wider multifaceted accommodation, so that otherwise viable projects become impossible 
to succeed, or are outright cancelled. As mentioned earlier, most projects are 
challenging enough that they need the full support of all governments, agencies, and 
quasi-government agencies if they are to succeed. Since there is no supranational body 
in East Asia to which politically based issues can be referred for solution, the project may 
drag on for a long time with the project builder incurring high costs. 
 
•  Currency and interest rate risk 
Most projects will involve borrowing and most will involve borrowing in one currency, 
erecting the structure or structures using another currency, and possibly, generating 
funds from the operation of the structures in  another currency. By their nature, most 
infrastructure projects take a long time to complete and during that time the currency 
exchange rates will change to some degree, as will the interest rates of each of those 
currencies. The changes cannot be predicted and covered in a project’s financial plan, 
and the magnitude of the changes also cannot be foreseen. Interest rates can be fixed 




commercial entity will be willing or able to assume the risk. Therefore, the long gestation 
period for construction and recovery of investment brings more uncertainty. The private 
sector accordingly needs a higher rate of return on investments, to compensate for that 
higher risk. 
 
•  Environmental and social impact 
Cross-border projects are normally on greenfield  sites and run the risk of altering in 
unpredictable ways the physical and social environment of the project area. 
Environmental degradation has been the common criticism of infrastructure development 
because forests may be cleared or water flows may be diverted from their natural path. 
The impact on society can be equally damaging as communities may have to be 
relocated, which can permanently destroy their traditional way of life and cultural 
practices. There may be greater pressures and incentives for people to cross borders 
either to work for the new projects or to escape the adverse effects of construction and 
development. Objections to infrastructure projects on environmental and social grounds 
can block or delay matters indefinitely, particularly if the objections come from or are 
supported by international non-government organizations. 
8.  EAST ASIAN INFRASTRUCTURE INVESTMENT FUND 
East Asian governments have long considered cross-border infrastructure a priority but 
progress has been slow. The demand for, and the difficulties of implementing cross-border 
regional infrastructure investments necessitate greater innovation in the way the region 
carries out and finances its ambitious development plans. Governments usually finance the 
bulk of their national infrastructure needs but cross-border needs require a pooling of 
financial resources from the public sector, multilateral development agencies, and the private 
sector due to the projects’ massive financial requirement. Some of the national infrastructure 
investments made by governments in their response to the current financial crisis may be 
part of the cross-border infrastructure network. In addition to this possibility, East Asia should 
earnestly  pool its financial resources to invest in the much-needed cross-border 
infrastructure and lay the foundation of the region’s future sustained high growth. For this 
purpose, the East Asian Infrastructure Investment Fund has been proposed which would 
create a financial mechanism that can mobilize infrastructure investment and expand the 
role of existing institutions. 
8.1  Existing mechanisms and proposals 
A number of broadly similar proposals have been made but they have not been fully 
implemented. These proposals include the following: 
•  ASEAN Infrastructure Bond Fund 
To address under-investment in ASEAN infrastructure projects, the ASEAN Finance 
Ministers established a regional infrastructure financing mechanism that aims to recycle 
surplus savings into ASEAN infrastructure development. The concept of the ASEAN 
Infrastructure Bond Fund is to have ASEAN governments (or central banks) invest in a 
junior tranche while the private sector invests in a senior tranche of the fund. The 
combined credit risks and guarantees from ASEAN governments would substantially 
reduce risk premiums and lower the costs of funding infrastructure projects. 
•  ASEAN Infrastructure Development Fund 
In May 2005, the then Malaysian Prime Minister Tun Abdullah Ahmad Badawi proposed 
that each ASEAN country set aside 0.1% of its foreign exchange reserves for this fund. 




amounted to US$471 million in 2007. There has been no further development of this 
proposal. 
•  ASEAN Infrastructure Financing Mechanism (AIFM) 
Very few private investors have participated in cross-border projects in Asia compared to 
other regions (Kohli 2008).  To address this shortfall, the ASEAN countries plan to 
facilitate more private sector investment in infrastructure projects through the creation of 
the  AIFM, which was agreed in 2006. The AIFM aims to (i) accelerate infrastructure 
development to promote regional economic growth and prosperity, (ii) recycle ASEAN 
savings to strengthen ASEAN's financial resilience, (iii) increase the supply of 
marketable assets from financing infrastructure that can generate more demand for 
intermediate financial services and help deepen the region’s capital,  (iv) support the 
branding of ASEAN as a distinct financial asset class, and (v) strengthen intra-regional 
trade and investment, with a view to accelerating the realization of the ASEAN Economic 
Community 2015 vision (Goh 2008). The AIFM Task Force has been set up and 
comprises senior delegates from the ASEAN Ministries. The focus areas of the Task 
Force include the promotion of best practices, revision of facilitation measures, and 
development of private sector capacity. 
•  Northeast Asia Development Bank 
The formation of a sub-regional bank was proposed during the Northeast Asia Economic 
Forum in October 1999. The forum had agreed to create an ad hoc committee for the 
establishment of the Northeast Asia Development Bank but the proposal has not been 
pursued further. 
•  Asian Infrastructure Financing Initiative 
The objective of the Asian Infrastructure Financing Initiative is to mobilize more 
resources for regional infrastructure development. There are two parts to the initiative. 
The first involves coordinated co-financing by governments and institutions such as 
national development banks to mobilize greater resources for a medium-term time period 
(for example 3–5 years) for specific regional infrastructure projects. The second part 
involves the establishment of funds managed by ADB or third parties that are targeted at 
pension funds and sovereign wealth funds; or by governments to co-finance sovereign 
and non-sovereign projects. 
The initiative has had a good start with the Government of the Republic of Korea, the 
Korea Export–Import Bank, and the Korea Development Bank pledging US$3.5 billion 
and the Islamic Development Bank pledging US$1.15 billion in 2008. ADB and the 
Islamic Development Bank are discussing the establishment of a private equity fund to 
invest in infrastructure projects in selected developing ADB member countries, namely, 
Afghanistan, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, 
Maldives, Pakistan, Tajikstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. In late 2008, a proposal 
was  made to set up an Islamic Asia Infrastructure Fund, whereby the Islamic 
Development Bank and ADB invest US$150 million and US$100 million, respectively, 
which would be managed by a private joint venture for this purpose. 
•  Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Infrastructure Initiative (APEC) 
APEC was directed by its Ministers in 1997 to work with the private sector in developing 
infrastructure initiatives for promoting integration and diversification of rural economies. 
In 1999, APEC and its private sector counterpart Pacific Economic Cooperation Council 
launched RISE—Regional Integration for Sustainable Economies—a public–private 
initiative designed to improve the economic viability of rural regions of APEC member 




economies, the APEC leaders directed their Ministers to accelerate the progress in 
implementing the e-APEC strategy, which will create an environment for infrastructure 
investment and technology development. 
•  Asian Development Bank 
ADB is presently a key initiator for regional infrastructure projects such as the Greater 
Mekong Sub-regional Development, and it has extensive experience and expertise in 
undertaking such projects. These projects have been aimed at both economic growth 
and social development. However, ADB’s ability to meet the large demand for regional 
infrastructure is constrained by its limited funds and wide membership, which covers all 
Asian countries. 
•   Overseas Development Aids 
The development of regional infrastructure has also been assisted by aids from donor 
countries such as Japan through loans at preferential rates. Many of these infrastructure 
projects are for countries at early stages of development and have been focused mainly 
on transportation infrastructure, education, and health facilities. 
8.2   Establishment of an East Asian Infrastructure Investment 
Fund 
Presently, there is no formal mechanism in which East Asian countries can decide on which 
cross-border infrastructures are needed or to address the  missing links in regional 
infrastructure networks (Mahani 2008). An East Asian Infrastructure Investment Fund (EAIIF) 
is proposed to fill this gap. Through the EAIIF, regional countries could agree on new cross-
border infrastructure projects that would benefit East Asia. The issue of missing links would 
also be solved through investment initiated by a regional mechanism, if the relevant 
countries do not have sufficient funds to finance them. Besides a collective regional 
investment action, cross-border infrastructure could also be created by coordinating national 
projects so that they form a compatible network. The EAIIF could be a platform for countries 
to coordinate their national infrastructure developments that could ultimately be linked to 
form regional networks. In this way, governments would still have the responsibility and 
oversight of their national infrastructure projects while meeting the larger regional goals. 
East Asian governments should take a more proactive and strategic role in ensuring that 
more cross-border infrastructure projects are successfully implemented. The many 
challenges confronting cross-border infrastructure projects can only be overcome by political 
commitments and a concerted drive to build the foundation for long-term regional growth. 
East Asia should establish a structure for this process. At the apex would be the political 
decision-making by East Asian leaders. This would be supported by a high-level committee 
or secretariat to execute the leaders’ decision, a funding institution, an implementation 
agency, and a monitoring unit. 
Political commitment is needed so that the risks and benefits can be shared among nations 
and between the public and private sectors. Mechanisms to identify the magnitude and 
distribution of the benefits and costs of cooperation should be established so that a fair 
system of distribution can be introduced, particularly if the benefits and costs vary 
dramatically. 
The private sector’s confidence to participate in these projects will be boosted when 
governments create credible policy regimes and regulatory environments that assist project 
implementation. The level of comfort will be increased if appropriate mitigation plans and 
adequate financial and technical resources are available to deal with trans-border 




The political decision-making process is important to ensure that infrastructure projects meet 
the objectives set, have wider externalities that benefit not only the participating countries 
but also the other countries in the region, and a balance is achieved between costs and 
benefits among the participating countries and funding parties. Another important role of the 
political process is to provide supportive policy regimes and regulations that are critical in 
facilitating these projects. Before this can be done, the objectives must be clearly defined 
and the lending criteria can then be designed to match the intended objectives. The EAIIF 
would be able to accelerate the implementation of decisions made by East Asian leaders. 
However, its creation alone will not ensure success because other supporting institutions will 
also need to be established to execute the decisions made by the leaders, implement the 
projects, and monitor progress. 
Cross-border infrastructure projects would be able to be carried out in three ways: through 
ADB, ODA, or EAIIF. The EAIIF would be to supplement the financing provided by ADB and 
ODA. There are many demands for ADB funds for infrastructure development from its 
members, and since its funding contributors include those from outside East Asia, it may not 
be able focus fully on infrastructure development in East Asia. ODA is very helpful for the 
least developed countries. However, middle-income recipient countries no longer qualify for 
such assistance due to their higher income levels. Since infrastructure projects are needed 
by countries at various stages of development and require large amounts of funding and 
involve high risks, the establishment of the EAIIF that could pool together funds from the 
public and private sectors and national and multilateral development agencies, would allow 
the building of a cross-border project and could supplement the funds contributed by ADB 
and ODA. 
The proposal to pool East Asian financial resources does not preempt the existing bilateral 
efforts to fund regional infrastructure projects such as the Japanese ODA or the US$10 
billion China–ASEAN Investment Cooperation Fund. Infrastructure projects financed by 
development aids are still necessary because they provide financing at  very reasonable 
costs to the least developed countries. Although they may wish to continue and expand their 
development aids and use their national aid institutions for implementation, these countries 
may wish to inform other regional countries, through the EAIIF, of these initiatives for better 
coordination and to avoid overlapping or even conflicting projects. Even with their own ODA, 
donor countries may wish to participate in the EAIIF for burden sharing due to the large 
funding requirements and for the coordination of policy, regulations, and standards. 
There are six elements in the  proposal  as shown in Figure 2: the ASEAN+3 Leader’s 
Summit, Executive Directorate Committee, Secretariat, EAIIF, Implementation Agency, and 




Figure 2: Mechanism for Cross-border Infrastructure Investment in East Asia 
 
Source: Author’s illustration. 
8.2.1  ASEAN+3 Leaders Summit 
The ASEAN+3 regional integration process has a record of 10  years of established 
cooperation and its annual Leaders Summit is the most suitable platform to get all the 
governments in the region participating in decision-making on regional infrastructure. 
Decisions on the projects to be undertaken are made through this mechanism and the 
decisions receive commitments from the governments in the region. This cooperative 
platform  also deals with inter-country, regulatory, and governance risks. 
The Leaders Summit would set a target for annual infrastructure investment and decide on 
the projects to be undertaken based on proposals submitted by the Executive Directorate 
Committee. 
8.2.2  Steering Committee 
This would comprise finance/economic ministers from the ASEAN+3 countries and heads of 
selected national and multilateral development agencies. It deals with regulatory framework, 
policy direction, and investment proposals. The steering committee would be briefed 
regularly by the secretariat on the status of current and proposed projects, and it will agree 
on proposals and recommendations to be forwarded annually to the Summit. Between 
Summits, the Steering Committee would also act within specific guidelines given to it from 
time to time by the Leaders Summit. This committee would also invite countries 
implementing ODA to share information on existing and planned projects in order to have a 
better overall view of the development of the region’s infrastructure. Countries implementing 
ODA would be able to suggest joint projects that could be undertaken with the EAIIF. 
This body would be particularly useful in quickly implementing the decisions made by the 
leaders, for making the necessary changes in regulations, and for soliciting top-level backing 
for budget commitments to ensure the continuity of projects. In evaluating infrastructure 
project proposals, the participation of ADB and other relevant development agencies would 
provide invaluable advice and lessons from their experience in other projects. 
8.2.3  Secretariat 
This body would coordinate the vital functions of the investment mechanism—raising funds 
(EAIIF), implementing projects, and monitoring outcomes. The funds raised by the EAIIF 
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execution. The Secretariat would receive and evaluate the performance of these projects 
based on the reports submitted  by the Monitoring Unit. The Secretariat would also be 
responsible for civil society participation and information disclosure. 
The Secretariat would be staffed by professional administrators and technical experts who 
are able to deal specific implementation issues. Their role would be to prepare for, and 
support Steering Committee meetings, and to deploy any decision made by the Steering 
Committee to the fund raising, implementation, and monitoring groups noted below. The 
Secretariat would also ensure that the work of those three groups is well understood by the 
Steering Committee, and if necessary make coordination actions. 
8.2.4  East Asian Infrastructure Investment Fund 
East Asian governments could establish a special fund, the EAIIF. It would be an 
independent legal entity that is a non-profit making institution. It would raise and lend funds 
for cross-border infrastructure projects and would be owned by East Asian countries, 
multilateral institutions, and the private sector. Besides its capital, it would raise additional 
funds from the public sector, development agencies, and the private sector. 
The purpose of this fund would be to fill the gap between projects that receive cheap funding 
(through development aids) and those that have to pay the full costs (entirely financed by the 
private sector at commercial rates). Undertaking cross-border projects on purely commercial 
funding is difficult because of the high cost as discussed earlier. At the same time, 
subsidized funding given by ODA and regional and multilateral agencies is limited and 
insufficient. The EAIIF funds would combine these two elements where a portion of the fund 
comes from governments and regional and multilateral agencies, while the balance is 
sourced from the private sector. The funding costs would be lower than commercial rates 
because of the subsidy element from governments’ contributions and backing and lower 
regulatory and policy risks. Since it would be backed by regional governments, the EAIIF 
would have a larger funding capacity because of its ability to raise funds from the private 
sector. 
It is proposed that the share structure of the EAIIF be as follows: 
Source  Share (%) 
Government  50 
Private sector  25 
Regional and multilateral development agencies  25 
Total  100 
The seed funds could come from capital contributions by the ASEAN+3 countries according 
to the size of their GDP, per capita income, or an alternative mutually agreeable formula. For 
instance, countries like Brunei Darussalam, PRC, Japan, Republic of Korea, Malaysia, and 
Singapore could be major contributors to these seed funds if equal weightage is used 
according to each country’s share of the total East Asian GDP or GDP per capita (see Table 




Table 13: Capacity of East Asian Countries to Contribute using Equal Weightage on 
Gross Domestic Product and Gross Domestic Product Per Capita 
    Share of Total 
GDP of NEAT 
member 
countries 




Weightage  Capacity to 
Contribute 
Brunei 
Darussalam  0%  50%  23%  50%  11.70% 
Cambodia  0%  50%  0%  50%  0.20% 
PRC  33%  50%  2%  50%  17.40% 
Indonesia  4%  50%  1%  50%  2.80% 
Japan  44%  50%  25%  50%  34.70% 
Republic of 
Korea  10%  50%  14%  50%  12.10% 
Lao PDR  0%  50%  0%  50%  0.30% 
Malaysia  2%  50%  5%  50%  3.40% 
Myanmar  0%  50%  0%  50%  0.20% 
Philippines  1%  50%  1%  50%  1.30% 
Singapore  2%  50%  24%  50%  12.80% 
Thailand  2%  50%  2%  50%  2.50% 
Viet Nam  1%  50%  1%  50%  0.70% 
Total  100%    100%    100.00% 
PRC = People’s Republic of China, Lao PDR = Lao People’s Democratic Republic, GDP = Gross Domestic Product, 
NEAT = Network of East Asian Think Tanks. 
Source: Author’s estimation. 
Funds from the public sector/government would take various forms—government-backed 
bonds that tap public savings from countries with high savings, part of the aid or soft loans 
from the economically advanced regional countries, investment by sovereign wealth funds, 
or utilization of instruments related to government foreign exchange reserves. Multilateral 
development agencies such as ADB could allocate a portion of their fund for infrastructure 
investment into the EAIIF. 
The private sector could either invest directly into the EAIIF or the funding could be raised 
through the Asian Bond Fund (ABF). The two phases of the Asian Bond Fund, with a total of 
US$3 billion, is hardly able to meet 1% of the estimated regional infrastructure financing 
needs. ABF I with a size of US$1 billion, involved the governments of 11 countries in the 
region voluntarily contributing about 1% of their reserves to a fund dedicated to purchasing 
regional sovereign and semi-sovereign bonds denominated in US dollars. ABF II, with US$2 
billion, was launched in May 2005 and invested in local currency and the sovereign and 
quasi-sovereign bonds of various Asian countries. The main drawback of the ABF is the size 
of the fund and the high transaction fees incurred because of the lack of secondary market 
liquidity (United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific 2006). 
However, the ABF could be a viable option if its size is increased. 
Another possible source of funding is the Asian Bond Markets Initiative (ABMI), which was 
endorsed by the finance ministers of ASEAN+3. The objective of the ABMI is to develop an 
efficient and liquid local currency bond market. A wider variety of issuers need to be involved 
and market infrastructure enhanced to foster this market before the ABMI can become a 
dependable source. 
Funds raised by the EAIIF should then be handled by the ADB for implementation because 
of the latter’s experience and capability. Setting up a new project implementation mechanism 
will require large additional resources, both financial and human, and may duplicate existing 




Asia’s socio-economic growth and development. This differs from ADB’s normal operations 
because it has an East Asian focus since the largest share of funding comes from East Asia 
and the projects to be undertaken are determined collectively by regional governments. ADB 
can contribute to the types and locations of the projects to be undertaken based on their 
knowledge, experience, and expertise, and it will ensure effective implementation. 
8.2.5  Implementation Agency 
Work carried out by this agency would be driven by ADB and supported by civil servants and 
project implementation experts. Technical evaluation, project management, selection of 
contractors, and project coordination in the countries involved would be the focus of this 
agency’s work. It would also harmonize regulations, procedures, technical standards, and 
the legal reforms needed to attract private financing to supplement public resources, reduce 
risks, and lower transaction costs. 
8.2.6  Monitoring Unit 
Some form of accountability has to be established so that the lender and project coordinator 
can be answerable to the ASEAN+3 leaders  and stakeholders involved. Performance 
indicators and measurements of success should be agreed by the stakeholders and 
attached to the projects. For instance, in the case of self-funding projects, the measurements 
of success could include the following: 
•  Speed of implementation 
•  Quality of final project 
•  Increase in trade and economic activity in the nations involved 
•  Increase in employment/reduced unemployment 
•  Improvement in income or reduction in poverty 
•  The ability of the project to self-fund its own maintenance 
•  Minimal leakages 
•  Cost saved 
It is proposed that ADB undertakes this task because it already has the capability based on 
its past experience. 
 
8.3  Project criteria 
The success of cross-border infrastructure investment depends a great deal on the criteria 
set for the projects. In the case of the EU, for instance, a Cohesion Fund was set up with 
specific objectives to assist in the integration of the European countries and the narrowing of 
the income differences between the different regions (Bhattacharyay 2008). This fund has 
been successful because the objectives are clear and the cooperative funding mechanism is 
clearly set out and agreed to by all participating nations.  The Cohesion Fund finances 
projects in environment and transport infrastructure such as roads, ports, airports, water 
supply, and waste water treatment. EU members eligible for these funds are those with a 
gross national product per capita less than 90% of the EU average. According to the 
European Commission, a €16 billion Cohesion Fund was made available between 2004 and 
2006 and more than half of the funding was reserved for new member states. 
In the case of East Asia, the objectives are likely to be similar to those of the ASEAN 
Infrastructure Financing Mechanism (Section 8.2). The criteria could be split into two groups. 




loan, the project is able to internally fund its servicing and maintenance costs. In this case, 
projects would be chosen based on the highest return on investment to attract private sector 
participation and to ensure the success of the debt instrument issued. Projects popular with 
the private sector, such as telecoms or energy, would be given priority. Initial successes are 
important to kick-start the marketability of the assets. 
The second criteria would be to select projects with the highest social benefit in order to 
meet the objective of East Asian integration. A certain amount of funds could be earmarked 
for this purpose. This would help to increase regional investments in infrastructure projects 
such as water and sewerage that will bring high social benefits but have generally been 
shunned by the private sector. 
9.  CONCLUSION 
In this present financial crisis, East Asia faces two major challenges to fiscal policy if it 
wishes to produce a sustained higher economic growth for the region. The first challenge is 
in financing and sustaining stimulus packages. The 1998 Asian financial crisis underscored 
the important role that fiscal stimulus played in reviving crisis-hit economies when the private 
sector was distressed. In the current crisis, East Asian countries face a similar challenge 
with the collapse in demand for exports. Many economies face the problem of insufficient 
financial resources to carry out programs to expand domestic demand. The second 
challenge is how to make the stimulus programs effective and productive. Policy makers are 
confronted with a choice of stimulus programs to ensure that they have high multiplier effects 
and that they will not impair the government’s fiscal position in the medium or long term. 
Most East Asian countries do not face serious problems in financing their stimulus package. 
During the critical period of this crisis, although the recovery is primarily based on fiscal 
stimulus, there is no scheme to assist countries facing funding shortages. The only proposal 
so far is from Japan, which offered a facility to fill in such a gap. Fiscal policy support is 
essential because funds have to be disbursed quickly in order to arrest rapid economic 
decline. Seeking assistance from multilateral agencies may take time. After the 1998 crisis, 
ASEAN+3 countries established the Chiang Mai Initiative that formed swap arrangements in 
case of attacks on regional currencies. No such mechanism, however, is available for short-
term financing for fiscal stimulus. It is timely for the region to consider setting up a fiscal 
assistance coordination scheme to help countries facing short-term funding  shortages in 
future economic crises. 
This assistance coordination should not be equated with fiscal policy coordination. The EU 
experience shows the difficulties in adhering to common fiscal policy targets—developing 
countries may require larger deficits to boost their economies and build capacity and fiscal 
caps can seriously hamper their policy flexibility. The two crises that have hit East Asia—the 
1998 and 2008 crises—have demonstrated the importance of immediately available financial 
support to mitigate the impact of massive externally-induced pressures. Coordination among 
key countries to provide emergency financial assistance that can enable countries to quickly 
implement fiscal stimulus projects is important. 
This paper has shown that East Asian countries have spent most of their stimulus packages 
on national infrastructure projects. These infrastructure projects have many spillover benefits 
as they provided a foundation for future growth. This current crisis is a good opportunity to 
redouble efforts  to build cross-border infrastructure facilities because they supplement 
national infrastructure projects, and the combination of these projects can produce sustained 
high growth for East Asia. This paper has discussed the justification, benefits, and 
challenges of such projects. It also proposes the establishment of an investment mechanism 




Proposals to invest in cross-border infrastructure are not new. Yet, these previous proposals 
have not been implemented and the analysis of challenges shows that for such ventures, 
political commitment is a very important factor. Whilst the benefits are obvious, the obstacles 
are many and the most critical is that countries are reluctant to contribute to a fund for 
investment. The developed countries in the region have sufficient financial resources either 
through their high domestic saving or large accumulation of international reserves, to start an 
infrastructure investment fund. Japan has mooted the idea of developing and co-financing 
the India–Mekong economic corridors while the PRC has started a US$10 billion 
infrastructure fund. Hopefully, the Chinese and Japanese initiatives can kick-start the 
regional cross-border infrastructure investment efforts. 
The EU and Latin America have made much more progress in cross-border infrastructure by 
establishing a regional mechanism that draws in regional development institutions and the 
private sector. The European Investment Bank is a non-profit and policy driven bank that 
offers long-term loans for investment projects. The involvement of the European Investment 
Bank in a project often provides a strong guarantee to commercial banks to finance private 
sector participation in projects. The Latin American experience shows that the most critical 
factor in promoting cross-border infrastructure investment is the ability to build regional 
initiatives that are based on a shared strategic vision (Kohli 2008). The Initiative for the 
Integration of Regional Infrastructure in South America, launched in 2000, has an investment 
target of US$68.3 billion, comprising 508 projects. International development agencies are 
heavily involved in helping to mobilize the financing as well as giving expert advice. 
The proposal contained in this paper recognizes the importance of establishing a 
cooperation mechanism at the highest political level to spearhead this initiative. A four-level 
mechanism is proposed—political leaders, senior officials, executives, and technical experts. 
Political coordination and endorsement is important and this can be done through the 
ASEAN+3 Leaders meetings. Governments must play a larger multifaceted role in setting up 
a framework for the sharing of risks between nations and between the private–public 
partnerships, the creation of credible policy regimes to ensure private sector confidence, and 
the provision of direct and indirect financial support, even if projects are private sector 
driven. Institutional capacity is also needed to implement political decisions. 
To reduce any risk of conflict between nations and to lower transaction costs, there should 
be either formal or informal institutional arrangements in the absence of a single pervasive 
sovereign jurisdiction. This process cannot be driven by the public sector alone, and thus 
participation of the private sector is important. For this the private sector needs clear and 
consistent political signals and direction. Only with these elements in place will cross-border 





Aizenman, J. 2007. Large hoarding of international reserves and the emerging global 
economic architecture. NBER Working Paper 13277. Available: 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13277. 
ADB. 2009. Investing in Sustainable infrastructure: Improving lives in Asia and the Pacific. 
Manila: ADB. Available: http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Sustainable-
Infrastructure/sustainable-infrastructure.pdf. 
Asian Development Bank Institute. 2009. Infrastructure for a Seamless Asia. Tokyo: ADBI. 
Bhattacharyay, B. N. 2008. The Need for Infrastructure. Paper presented at the Third 
Workshop on Book Preparation ADB/ADBI’s Flagship Study Infrastructure and 
Regional Cooperation on 2–22 October. 
Colecchia, A., and P. Schreyer. 2001. ICT investment and economic growth in the 1990s: Is 
the United States a unique case? A Comparative study of nine OECD countries, 
OECD Science, Technology and Industry Working Papers, 2001/7. OECD. 
Available: http://ideas.repec.org/a/red/issued/v5y2002i2p408-442.html. 
Cook, C. C., T. Duncan, S. Jitsuchon, A. K. Sharma, and W. Guobao. 2004. Assessing the 
Impact of Transport and Energy Infrastructure on Poverty Reduction. Manila: ADB. 
Available: http://www.adb.org/Documents/Reports/Assessing-Transport-
Energy/default.asp. 
Estache, A. 2004. Emerging infrastructure policy issues in Developing Countries: A Survey 
of the recent economic literature. World Bank Policy Research Working Paper No. 
3442. Washington, DC: World Bank. Available: 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=625320. 
Fay, M., and T. Yepes. 2003. Investing in Infrastructure: What is needed from 2000 to 2010? 
World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3102. Available: 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=636464. 
Gramlich, E. M. 1994. Infrastructure investment: A review essay. Journal of Economic 
Literature 32: 1176–1196. 
Goh, C. Y. 2008. ASEAN Infrastructure Financing Mechanism: concepts and progress. 
Paper presented at the ASEAN Infrastructure Financing Mechanism Conference, 
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia. 10 November. 
IMF. 2008. World Economic Outlook: Housing and Business Cycle, April. 
Available: http://www.imf.org/ external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/pdf/text.pdf. 
———. 2009. IMF Staff Position Note SPN/09/13: Fiscal Implications of the Global 
Economic and Financial Crisis. 
Available: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/spn/2009/spn0913.pdf. 
———. 2009. Initial Lessons of the Crisis. Available: http://www.imf.org/ 
external/np/pp/eng/2009/020609.pdf. 
———. 2009. Regional Economic Outlook Asia and Pacific: Global Crisis: The Asian 
Context. 
Available: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/reo/2009/apd/eng/areo0509.pdf. 
———. 2009. World Economic Outlook: Crisis and Recovery. Available: http://www.imf.org/ 
external/pubs/ft/weo/2009/01/pdf/text.pdf. 
———. 2009. World Economic Outlook Dataset. April 2009. Available: 




Kohli, H. 2008. Financing Regional Networks. Paper presented at the Third Workshop on 
Book Preparation ADB/ADBI’s Flagship Study Infrastructure and Regional 
Cooperation on 21–22 October. 
 
Kumar, N. (ed), and P. De. 2008. East Asian infrastructure in a comparative perspective: An 
Analysis of infrastructure index. In International infrastructure development in East 
Asia: Towards balanced regional development and integration, ERIA Research 
project report 2007, No.2, Chiba: IDE-JETRO. 
Mahani Z. A. 2008. Proposal for East Asian Infrastructure Investment Fund. Paper presented 
at the Third Workshop on Book Preparation ADB/ADBI’s Flagship Study 
Infrastructure and Regional Cooperation on 21–22 October. 
Nangia, R. 2008. Overview of Infrastructure Financing in ASEAN. ADB Internal Report. 
Manila: ADB. 
Neill, J. R. 1996. Fueling the engine of growth with investment in infrastructure: A lesson 
from neoclassical growth theory. Journal of Macroeconomics 18: 521–529. 
Park, D. 2007. Beyond liquidity: New uses for developing Asia’s Foreign Exchange reserves. 
ERD Working Paper No. 109. Milan: ADB. 
Available: http://www.adb.org/Documents/Briefs/ADB-Briefs-001-Sovereign-Wealth-
Funds.pdf. 
Rabanal, P. 2004. Monetary Policy Rules and the US Business Cycles: Evidence and 
Implications. IMF Working paper, Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. 
Richards, D. 2008. Global Infrastructure-a Growth Story. In Infrastructure Finance: Trends 
and Techniques, edited by H. A. Davis. London: Euromoney Books. 
World Bank. 2009. East Asia and Pacific Update: Battling the Forces of Global Recession. 
Available: http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTEAPHALFYEARLYUPDATE/Resour
ces/550192-1238574864269/5976918-1239010682147/update_april09_fullreport.pdf. 
World Economic Forum, 2007. India Economic Summit ; Infrastructure Development.  
Available :http://www.weforum.org/pdf/summitreports/india2007/infrastructure_develo
pment.htm 
Yepes, T. 2004. Expenditure on infrastructure in East Asia region, 2006-2010. Background 
paper for Asian Development Bank, Japan Bank for International Cooperation and 
World Bank, East Asia Pacific Infrastructure Flagship Study. Washington, DC: World 
Bank. 